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ABSTRACT·

If labor market participation for self-employed farm households and
family labor use in family farms are decisions determined endogenously, the

estimation of production (or profit) functions suffer from a simultaneity bias
unless appropriate instruments are used.

An agricultural household model that

encompasses both the production and consumption decisions of farm operators can
motivate the choice of such instruments.

A conditional profit function is

estimated with an endogenously determined family labor demand function.
Differences in production behavior conditional on farm household's
participation in the labor market are tested using a two-stage switching
regressions model with a criterion function that enables endogenous switching.
Empirical results using farm-level survey. data from Bangladesh indicate
that endogeneity of family labor demand is indeed statistically significant for
farm households who do not participate in the labor market, but is not
significant for those who do participate in the labor market.

The results

further suggest that the effect of education is underestimated when account is
not taken of the endogeneity of labor demand.

When the productivity gains made

from decisions regarding appropriate level and mix of family labor use in farm
and off-farm market uses are taken into account, r'esults indicate that farmer
education has indeed a productive value to farm efficiency.

FADER EDUCATION AND FADI EFFICIENCY: THE KOLE OF EDUCATION REVISITED•

Introduction
The role of education in increasing productivity has been recognized as
an important form of human capital that may be essential for transforming
traditional agriculture (Schultz, 1964).

Much research has sought to evaluate

the productive role of education for developing agriculture (Yotopoulos, 1967;
Lockhead, Jamison, and Lau, 1980; Ram, 1980; Jamison and Moock, 1981).

The

primary postulate is that education may have productive value to farmers
because (1) it helps them to produce larger quantities of output from the same
measured quantities of inputs, and because (2) it helps them to choose an
optimal bundles of inputs, a more efficient output- mix, and a more appropriate
scale.1
The approach often used to estimate the contribution of education to
agricultural production is to estimate either a production function or a profit
function with education as one of several regressors (Lockhead, Jamison, and
Lau, 1980).

This paper argues that with this approach the contribution of

education may not be measured appropriately if the function is subject to
simultaneous equation bias.

Simultaneity bias may arise if production and

consumption decisions of self-employed agricultural households are
nonseparable.

Nonseparability of production and consumption decisions in turn

arise if households use family labor in family farms but do not sell out labor
for market work.
The paper is organized in the following manner.

First, a brief summary

of research using the production function framework for analyzing the
contribution of education is presented and its potential bias if
nonseparability between production and consumption decisions of farm households
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arises is discussed.

Second, an agricultural household model is developed

where participation in the labor market by farm households is endogenous, and
behavioral differences between participant and nonparticipant households are
emphasized.

It is argued that such a framework can provide appropriate

instruments which can remove potential simultaneous equation bias.

Third. a

two-stage regressions model with endogenous switching is suggested for dealing
with possible differences in production behavior between farm households which
do and do not participate in the labor market.

Fourth. an empirical analysis

of farm-level data from Bangladesh using a conditional profit function approach
is reported which confirm the expected bias.

Finally, in order to capture the

productivity gains of schooling that may accrue through the allocative role of
education in family labor allocation. an unconditional profit function is
estimated that shows that education has a significant productive value to
Bangladeshi farmers.

The Production Function Model

The contribution of education to agricultural productivity is called
the technical efficiency effect, or worker effect. or simply the productivity
effect of education.

Yotopoulos (1967) were among the first to use a

production function to examine the impact of education on agricultural
productivity.

Subsequent studies (e.g •• Lockhead et al. 1980; Ram, 1980;

Jamison and Moock, 1981) followed a similar approach to evaluate the impact of
education on agricultural production.

Given information on gross output of the

farm (Q). land under cultivation (T). man-days of family labor (L)2, quantities
of purchased inputs (V). and educational level of the household head (E), one
can assess the technical efficiency effect of education in terms of its scale
effect on agricultural production.

The general functional form of
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such a production relation may be formally expressed as:

(1)

Q = Q (T, L, V, E)

If we define aQ/aE as the marginal product of education, specification
(1) in Cobb-Douglas or linear form can be used to estimate the worker effect.
Within this framework, it is also possible to estimate the allocative effect of
education (Welch, 1970).
Estimates from (1), however, can be either incomplete or biased.
First, estimating the worker effect is biased due to the well-known
simultaneous equations bias caused by endogeneity of variable inputs.

Second,

estimating the allocative effect in a multiple regression when so many
endogenous variables are held constant leaves little wroomw for education to
improve decision-making which can affect farm production.

Third,

by focussing

only on cost minimization, the production function approach ignores any returns
from the changing output mix.
An alternative to the production function approach is to use a

restricted profit function that can measure both the allocative and worker
effects of education.

The restricted profit function3 corresponding to (1) can

be written as

(2)

Y = Y(P 4 , Pv, L, T, E)

where Y is the level of profit defined as gross value of crops less expenditure
on purchased inputs, P 4 , and Pv are, respectively, the vector of output prices,
and the vector of input prices.

Since it is a function of all input and output

prices and the Wf,ixedw inputs, a restricted profit function also can
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capture the gains made from choosing a more optimal mix of crops.

However, the

restricted profit function (although it reduces the simultaneity bias due to
endogeneity of purchased inputs) may also be subject to similar simultaneous
equations bias, for some of the •fixed• inputs may be endogeneous (Barichello,
1984). 4

Thus, simultaneity bias may arise, even in a restricted prof it

function, if the functional specification is mis-specified to the extent that
farm households' owned inputs such as family labor are endogenously determined.
If farm households sell out labor, and if family and hired labor are
perfect substitutes in production, then family labor demand is determined by
market prices and factors related only to farmers' production decisions.

In

this case, endogeneity of family labor demand would not affect the production
or profit function estimate of education, given arguments in Zellner, Kmenta,
and Dreze (1966).
However, for self-employed farmers, if family labor is not sold out
either because of labor market preferences or because family and hired labor
are not perfect substitutes in production, it is possible to show that family
labor demand is endogenously determined not by production decisions alone, but
also by farmers' consumption decisions.

This implies that family labor demand

is determined by factors that include, among others, an education variable.
This clearly produces a simultaneous equation bias.

It may serve as a

justification for estimating the profit function conditional on family labor in
a simultaneous equations framework, while allowing family labor to be
determined endogenously.

This may also permit the education variable to pick

up any returns in variable profit due to education-induced variations in the
predicted level of family labor input.
The question that arises then is, what are appropriate instruments that
can be ·used to obtain consistent estimates of the education variable?

An

agricultural household model that combines both the production and consumption
decisions of farm operators who are producers and consumers of their own
products may motivate the choice of appropriate instruments.
There is an additional problem, moreover.

Even if endogeneity of

family labor in the restricted profit function is corrected by using
instruments provided by the farm household model, farm households'
self-selection regarding labor market participation can produce sample
selection bias in the regression equations.

Since labor market participation

is a choice variable, family characteristics including education, among other
factors, may influence this decision-making process.

Correcting sample

selection bias may mean reducing the influence of these family characteristics
on the productive role of farmer education.

Consequently, the resulting

estimates may, indeed, show the causal impact of education on farm efficiency.5

An Agricultural Household model

The essential characteristic of an agricultural household model is that
it encompasses both production and consumption decisions of farm operators who
supply family labor to their agricultural operations and derive income fQr
consumption from such activities.

However, production and consumption

decisions may be studied separately under the assumptions that perfect
substitutablity between family and hired labor exists in production and that
there is a fixed agricultural wage rate determined by the market.

The

interdependence between production and consumption flows from production to
consumption decisions but not the other way around, since income influences
consumption decisions, and any excess (or shortage of) family labor can be sold
(or bought) at the fixed market wage rate (Strauss, 1984).
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There may exist another source of dependency between production and
consumption decisions which. unlike the other case. makes production and
consumption decisions nonseparable for either of two reasons: the labor market
is imperfect or it does not exist in the first place.

While the first

condition is not typically thought to be important in agricultural household
modelling. the second factor is often emphasized (Strauss. 1984).

Thus. for

self-employed farmers. if family and hired labor are imperfect substitutes in
production and no family labor is sold out. we get a case where the household
faces a •virtual• or shadow wage rate to equate demand for family labor with
its supply.

Such a wage rate is thought to depend on all the variables the

household takes as given. affecting either production or consmption. thereby
making the two sets of decisions nonseparable.

The agricultural household

model being developed here is such a case where production and consmption
decisions are nonseparable.

Production or profit function estimation cannot

capture the true productivity effect of education unless it is estimated along
with a labor demand function that is determined endogenously by the household's
production and consumption behavior.
Assume that agricultural households supply family labor to family
farming.

In addition. if the households wish. they can supply family labor to

market work for cash income.

Market work may consist of agricultural and

non-agricultural wage employment.

Assume further that there is no fixed market

wage for supply of family labor to market activities.

Instead. the members of

a household unit (if they decide to participate in the labor market) face a
market wage schedule which is a positive function of education.

However. if

there is imperfect substitutability between family and hired labor. or if
family labor cannot be marketed for labor market preference. we get a case
where family labor supply to market work is zero.6
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Thus, the maximization problem of a self-employed farm household unit
facing self-selection regarding labor market participation of its members may
be operationalised in the following way.
Farm households are assllllled to maximize the objective function given by
3(i) subject to the constraints 3(ii) through 3(vi), where

C

=

Conslllllption of non-farm conslllller goods

M = Consumption of leisure
Q

= Agricultural

output

R = Consumption of own agricultural produce

Pq = Price of agricultural output
Pc = Price of non-farm conslllllption goods
L = Family labor used in farming

s

= Family labor used in market work

E = Education characteristics
T = Farm size
W = Per period income received from market work
0 = Total working hours available to the household unit.

3(i)

U = U (M, C, R)

3 ( ii)

Pee= Pq

3(iii)

w=

3 ( iv)

Q = Q (L, E, T)

3(v)

n

3 (vi)

S 2 0

=

(Q -

R) +

ws

f (E), f'>O, f' '<O

L+ S + M
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Here equation 3(i) is the familiar utility function, 3(ii) is the
budget constraint, 3(iii) is the wage function for market work, 3(iv) is agri
cultural production function7, 3(v) is the household time constraint for
working hours, and 3(vi) is the binding constraint for self-employed farmers
After nece_ssary substitutions, we

who do not use family labor for market work.
can form the following Lagrange function:

where Al is the marginal utility of income and A2 is the marginal disutility of
family labor use in market work and both are positive.

However, A2 is zero for

those households who supply family labor to market work and thus 3(vi) is not
binding for them.
The first-order conditions for maximization yield the following
equations:

= - autaM

=o

5(i)

a6/aL

5(ii)
5(iii)

a6tas = -autaM + i 1 cw - i2/i1> = 0
a6tac = autac + i 1 <-Pc> = 0

5(iv)

a6/aR

5(v)

a6/ai 1

5(vi)

a6tai 2 = -s = 0

=

+ A1P4 aQ/aL

au/aR + i 1 c-P 4 >

= PqQ

=0

+ f(E)S - PcC - PqR

=0

Equations 5(i) and 5(ii) yield the optimal condition for family labor
allocation between farming and leisure (or to market work) which may be
expressed as:
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= (W

(6)(i)

PqaQ/aL

(6)(ii)

PqaQ/aL =

- µ)

w.

whereµ is equal to X2/X1.

= w*.

for non-participant households;

for participant households;

The equilibrium condition for family labor

allocation for farm households who decide to participate in the market work is
the equality between returns from two activities. family farming and market
work.

For those who decide not to participate it is the equality between the

return from farming and what may be called the •reservation• or •virtual• price
of family labpr,

w*.

However,

w*.

unlike

w.

is endogenously determined by

parameters affecting either the household's production or consumption
decisions, since it depends on X2 and X1, which are endogenous variables in the
system.

Thus. even if Wis fixed by the market and not determined by the

household characteristics. such as the endowment of education, there is a
possibility that production and consumption decisions become non-separable for
those households who decide not to participate in the labor market.

This is.

however, not the case for those who decide to sell out family labor for market
work. 8

In order to examine the effects of education on labor demand in agri
culture as well as on the shadow wage,
households, assume thatµ is fixed.

w*,

for non-participants farm

Total differentiation of the first-order

equations in the system of equations (5)

with respect to change in E will

yield the following system of equations in matrix form given by (7).
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(7)

(UMM +A1Pqa 2Q/aL2)

UMM

-UMc

-UMR

P4aQ/aL

UMM

UMM

-UMc

-UMR

(W -

-UcM

-UcM

Ucc

UCR

-URM

-URM

URc

URR

P4aQ/aL

w

-Pc

0

-1

0

0

dL

-Al

dS

-Pc

0

dC

-Pq

0

dR

-Pq

0

0

dAl

0

0

0

dµ

µ)

-A1Pq a 2Q/aLaE
-A1f'

=

0

dE

0

-(f'S + P4aQ/aE>
0

Thus, solving the above system (7) for aL/aE and aµ/aE. we get

(8)

aL/aE

= (A1/A) [-<f'S+PqaQ/aE)(Dz) + A1Pqa 2Q/aLaE (2UCRPcPq - UccP 2q
- URRP2c>]

where A is the bordered Hessian determinant of left-hand matrix of equation

(7), A11 is the cofactor of elements in the first row and first column of the
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matrix formed by the Cramer's rule, and

Second-order conditions for constrained maximization with two
constraints restrict that A is positive and A11 is negative, while for a
constrained utility maximization case, (2UCRPcPq - UccP 2 q - URRP 2 c> is
positive.

Even after assuming that cross- and direct-derivatives in the

utility function are, respectively, positive and negative, it is not possible
to sign the determinants, D1, and D2.

However, if, for simplicity, one assumes

that both D1 and D2 are less than zero, then, assuming diminishing marginal
productivity of labor in agricultural production, one can get the following
results:
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Equation (10) suggests that for a household which sells no labor to the
market, an increase in education will increase the demand for family labor in
agriculture so long as the increase in the level of education has a
non-negative effect on marginal productivity of labor.

If education has a

negative effect on marginal productivity of labor, its effect on labor demand
is indeterminate.

Note that this effect of Eon labor demand crucially depends

on what happens to marginal productivity of labor in agriculture and not on the
relative returns between two income earning activities.

This is caused by the

assumption that family labor supply to market work is zero.9
The effect of Eonµ (i.e., the difference between market and farm
wage) is important to know because it affects the virtual wage rate,

w•,

by the

following condition:

(12) dW*/dE

=

f' - dµ/dE

By using results in (11) one can assert that education's effect on the virtual
wage rate is in general ambiguous.

In other words, if education has a positive

effect on the difference between market and farm wages, an increase in
education will have an indeterminate effect on the shadow wage of the family
labor. However, if education has a negative effect on this wage difference, an
increase in education leads to an increase in the virtual wage for family
labor.
The effect of education on family labor demand for farm households who
supply family labor to market work in addition to family farming can be shown
by totally differentiating the optimal condition, 6(ii), for family labor
allocation with respect to education, E.10
education on family labor demand, L, is:

Thus, for S

> 0,

the effect of

13

where D = P 4a2Q/aL2.

Since a2Q/aL2 is negative by assumption, it follows that

This suggests that the effect of education on family labor demand in
agriculture for households selling out family labor for market work depends on
the relative returns of labor in two income earning activities.

This further

implies that even though non-separability between production and consumption
decisions does not arise for households who sell out family labor for market
work, education may influence family labor demand in farming if education

affects labor productivity in both activities,
According to what is known as the •screening hypothesis,• "Education
does not make workers more productive; it merely identifies those who were more
productive to begin with• (Jamison and Moock, 1981; p. 5).

Thus, if we further

assume that education affects neither farm labor productivity nor the market
yield on labor (if supplied) so that f'= P4 a2Q/aLaE = 0, equations (10) and
(11) show that even then education has a positive effect on both the shadow
wage of family labor and on the family labor demand in agriculture.

This

implies that for a self-employed farm operator who does not sell out his family
labor, even if education does not affect his family labor productivity in
agriculture, an increase in educational endowment will increase the •virtual•
wage rate for his family labor and also will increase the demand for family

labor in family farming.

This suggests that even under the screening
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hypothesis, family labor demand in agriculture becomes endogenous for
households who do not sell out labor in the market.
In contrast, under the same hypothesis, labor endogeneity in the
production or profit function does not arise for households who participate in
the market by selling part of its family labor pool.

This is evident in

equation (13) above.
The optimal values of endogenous variables generated in the framework
of an agricultural household model may be expressed in the reduced-form
equations as follows:
15 ( i)

L* = L* (0, E, T,

15 ( ii)

s•

=

s•

(0,

Pq, Pc)

E, T, Pq, Pc), if S>O or else

s•

= 0,

when S=O
15 ( iii)

c• = c*

(0,

E, T, Pq, Pc)

15(iv)

R* = R*

(0,

E, T, Pq, Pc)

where the asterisks refer to optimal values of the variables.

By plugging 15( i) into the agricultural production function 3(iv), we
get the agricultural output function as

16(iv)

Q*

=

Q* (L*, E, T)

where family labor demand is endogenously determined.

Note that variables O,

Pq, Pc enter into the labor demand equation, 15(i), or modified production
function equation, 16(iv), as instruments only if non-separability between
production and consumption decisions holds for the farm operators.

If the

decisions are separable, these variables will be irrelevant instruments in
either equation.

15
Thus, family labor endogeneity is a relevant issue only when
nonseparability between production and consumption arises in the event that
farm households do not sell out family labor for market work.

Alternatively,

labor endogeneity may not be a crucial problem and, hence, estimates of
education variables will tend to be unaffected if family labor is sold out for
market work.

Thus, one needs to test for labor endogeneity for both types of

households, those who sell out family labor and those who do not.

A Switching Regression Model

Farm households' participation in the labor market is an endogenously
determined variable.

One may use a procedure that utilizes information on farm

households' labor market participation and then examine its impact on
underlying differences in their production behavior.

This has been called a

two stage regressions model with endogenous switching (Akin et al., 1985; Kenny
et al., 1979; Maddala, 1983).
We have two types of sample households producing agricultural output
who sell and do not sell family labor to market work.

This leads us to the

following two regimes:

where Y1i is the level of restricted profit (value of gross output less

expenditure on purchased inputs) of the ith farm household, given that the
household sells family labor to market work; Y2i is the level of restricted
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profit of the ith farm household, given that the household does not sell labor
to market work; Xi is a vector of explanatory variables including family labor
and education of the ith household; ~1 and ~2 are unknown coefficient vectors;
and µli and µ2i are unknown disturbances.

The system of equations (17) and

(18) allow farm households who sell out labor to be behaviorally different
(i.e., in terms of output production and farm profit) from those who do not.

Alternatively, one can write the above specification as follows:

where Yi is the level of farm profit and Ii is a dummy variable, 1 for
household who sells out labor, and O otherwise.

Equation (19) allows for

interaction effects of labor market participation with other explanatory
variables.

If E(µi*> = 0 in (19), one can examine the expected effect of labor

endogeneity on production and farm profit:
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However, the problem that emerges is that selling out labor to market
work is endogeneous .

where I 1 =

This can be modelled as follows:

0; Ii~ 0
1; 1 1

>0

Here Zi are exogenous variables, y is a vector of unknown coefficient s, and e
is a disturbance term.
Now, we assume that the three error terms, µli• µ2 1 , and e 1 , follow a
multivariat e normal distribution with mean vector zero, and covariance matrix

l

where:

a11 a12 a1e

l = a21 a22 a2e
ael ae2 aee
The criterion function (22) enables endogenous switching in the two
regimes (17) and (18) (Maddala, 1983).

Households self-select into equations

(17) and (18) as long as a 8 1 and a 8 2 are non-zero •. Although OLS cannot be used
to estimate (17) and (18) because the expectation s of the disturbance s are
non-zero, it is possible to estimate them by OLS under the following conditions
as shown by Lee (1976):
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where ♦

is the standard normal density function and 8 is the corresponding

distribution function.
We define W1i = ♦ (Ziy)/8(Ziy), and W2i = ♦ (Ziy)/(1-8(Ziy))
which enables us to rewrite (15) and (16) as

where the residuals a1i

=

µli + a1 8 W1i; and a2i = µ2i + a2 8 W2i•

Since+ and 8 are a function of ZiY• we have a two-step method of
estimating the restricted profit functions.

As a first step, because we have

assumed that the three error terms follow normal distributions, (22) can be
estimated using the probit procedure with the normalization a11 = 1.

Then+

and 8 are estimated and are used to construct the inverse of Mills' ratios, W1i
and W2i•

Ordinary least squares may then be used to estimate (25) and (26).

This procedure will be used to estimate the restricted profit functions
conditional on family labor using data from Bangladeshi farm households.

Data and Its Characteristics

The data used in this paper were collected for a separate study
(Khandker, 1985) by drawing a sample of 500 households from seven districts of
Bangladesh.

The sample comprises households both from farming populations and

non-farming populations.

The seven districts were selected from regions north,

east, and west of Dhaka as well as a central part of Bangladesh.

The sample

included information on inputs and outputs of individual farms from several

19
communities across Bangladesh, which provides a unique opportunity to test the
effect of education on farm efficiency.

However, data from only 364 farm

households were used in this paper, because these households have no missing
values for the variables used in the empirical implementation of the model.
These 364 sample households belong to six districts, which are, respectively,
Rangpur, Bogra, Sherpur, Tangail, Comilla, and Dhaka.

Data on input and output

were collected on an individual crop basis during a single data collection
period.

Data used in this paper are gross values of outputs, and inputs which

were valued at the observed farm-level prices.
Households use family as well as hired labor in family farming.
However, out of 364 households, only 130 households sell out family labor to
market work, which consists of both agricultural and nonagricultural
activities.

Some of the households which do not sell out labor for market work

use family labor both in family farming and family nonfarming activities.

A

small amount of female and child labor was used by both types of households
(Table 1).

Thus, family labor mostly consists of household male members'

labor.
The dependent variable is the farm profit which is calculated as gross
value of outputs less expenditure on purchased inputs.

The explanatory

variables in the restricted profit function are family labor, land owned,
education level of the household head who is often a male, education level of
spouse, and average schooling of other household members wcrking.

The

instruments used in family labor demand function are variables such as family
size, consisting of economically active members (age 10 and above but less than
65), community-level agricultural wage paid to hired adult male worker, and the
age of the household head.

The means and standard deviations of the variables

by nonparticipants and participants households are shown in Table 1.

20

Table 1. Jleaa and Standard Deviation (S.D) of Variables
Variable name

Non-participants
(Sample 234)
Mean
S.D.

Profit (Taka)a
18399.45
Land owned (hectare)
1.28
Family adult male(mandays)
150.56
Family female (mandays)
38.45
Family child labor
2.75
Family labor (mandays)b
186.56
146.11
Hired labor (mandays)
Family sizeC
6.24
Schooling of household(HH)
head (years)
3.93
Age of HH head (years)
46.81
Schooling of spouse(years)
1.53
37 .23
Spouse's age (years)
Average schooling of
3.04
household members working
Average age of household
22.52
members working
Percentage of HH heads
0
work in off-farm work
0
Actual wage of heads(Taka)
Percentage of spouses
0
work in off-farm work
Spouse's wage (Taka)
0
Percentage of other members
0
work in off-farm work
0
Members' wage (Taka)
a

b

C

Participants
(Sample 130)
S.D.
Mean

19438.93
1.13
166.63
31.93
10.24
171.37
131.82
2.60

16445.15
1.39
115.96
30.59
1.25
141.76
160.32
6.15

16415.06
2.03
149.51
35.31
8.24
159.34
165.24
2.25

3.97
12.44
2.45
10.78

7 .40
44.02
4.33
35.38

5.26
13.42
4.46
11.89

2.24

5.10

4.98

8.13

26.83

10.67

0
0

0.58
39.58

0.49
16.08

0
0

0.31
29.07

0.46
13.07

0
0

0.35
27.61

0.48
10.66

Profit is defined as gross value of crops grown over the year 1983-1984
less expenditure on purchased inputs.
Family labor is calculated as family adult male labor plus female and
child labor adjusted by the differences in the community-level wage rates
of three categories of labor. The community wages of three categories
of labor are, respectively, Tk. 17.95, 8.40, and 9.22.
Family size is defined as the number of family members of the household
unit who belong to age group 10-65. This is what in Bangladesh called
the economically active population.
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P.apirical Results

The parameter estimates for the probit procedure of farm households'
participation in the labor market are shown in Table 2.
estimates are of the expected sign.

Most of these

Landholding has a negative effect on the

probability of farm households selling out of family labor to market work,
presumably working as an income effect on family labor supply.

Community-level

agricultural wage rate for casual hired labor decreases the probability of
selling out family labor to market work, perhaps indicating that an increase in
wage for casual hired labor will reduce (increase) the supply of family labor

to off-farm (farm) work, thereby substituting family labor for hired labor.

On

the other hand, family size increases the probability of selling out family
labor to market work, suggesting that the larger the number of working members
in the household, the more likely that family labor is sold out for market
work.

Furthermore, all the education variables have significant positive

effects on the probability of household members' participation in the labor
market, mostly in nonfarm activities.

The chi-square ratio which tests whether

coefficients on all regressors except the intercept are zero indicates that the
model predicts well household member's labor market participation in off-farm
work.

This also suggests that the households' selling out of family labor to

market work is an endogenously determined decision.

A restricted profit function, conditional on family labor, can be
derived from a Cobb-Douglas production function using duality theory (Jamison,
and Lau, 1982). 1 1

It is a function of land, family labor, schooling of three

categories as described earlier.12

The dependent variable, profit

(calculated

as gross value of crops less expendjture on purchased inputs) and explanatory
variables, land and family labor, are in logarithmic values.
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Table 2.

Probit Maximma Likelihood Est:iaates of Labor Karket Participation

Explanatory Variables

Coefficients

Intercept
Landholding
Family size of active
members in the family
Community wage for casual
hired agricultural labor
Schooling of household
head (male)
Schooling of spouse
Schooling of other working
household members
(-2.0) x Log Likelihood
Ratio
Number of observations (N)

-1.1S2

-2.0S

-0.07S

-1.93**

0.027

0.83

-0.011

-0.36

t - Statistics

1.62***

0.038
0.104

3.30*

0.074

63.099
364

Notes: Dummy dependent variable= 1, if any member of the household unit works
for market work, 0 otherwise (participant households= 130, nonparticipant
households= 234). •,••,and••• denotes, respectively, 1%, S%, and 10%
levels of significance. Other working members include both children and
non-children members working for the household and living with the household.
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The restricted profit function is estimated by OLS separately for participant
and nonparticipant households using the Mills-ratio estimate associated with
the self-selected subsample.

If the unmeasured characteristics influencing

sample selection and farm efficiency are jointly normally distributed, then the

influence of the selectivity associated with labor market participation can be
•taken out• of the restricted profit function estimates by including the

Mills-ratio estimates.

Thus, the •corrected• estimates of restricted profit

function yield the estimates solely as a function of occupational selectivity.
Thus, the inclusion of the Mills-ratio variable in the restricted profit
function not only purges out selectivity effects, but also its coefficient
provides a consistent estimate of the covariance between the unmeasured
characteristics in the profit function and the participation equation (Heckman,
1979).

Moreover, estimates of the conditional profit function are also

corrected for possible endogeneity of family labor using two-stage least
squares (2SLS) for both the participants and nonparticipants farm households.

In the two-stage least square procedure a family labor demand function is
fitted first on the basis of a two-stage switching regressions model to
ascertain whether differences exist in household behavior regarding family
labor use in own farming.

The instruments used in the estimation of the family

labor demand function include community-level wages for casual hired labor, age
of household head, and family size.

Table S presents the estimates of family

labor demand functions for both types of households.

These estimates are used

to predict family labor use in family farming which in turn are used in the
second stage of the 2SLS estimation of the conditional profit function.

Table

3 shows both OLS and 2SLS regression estimates of the conditional profit

function for labor market participant households, while Table 4 reports similar
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Table 3. Two-stage Switching Regression Bstiaates of a Restricted Profit
Function for Participant Households
(sample 119)

-------------------Explanatory Variables
OLS estimates
Intercept
Landholding
Family labor
Schooling of household
head (male)
Schooling of spouse
Schooling of other working
household members
Mills ratio
R2

SSE
degrees of freedom
F ratio

2SLS estimates

10.439 (8.41)*
0.613 (5.95)*
0.152 (1.88)***

10.402 (6.45)*
0.607 (3.39)*
0.160 (0.68)

-0.• 058 (-1.93)***
-0.029 (-0.65)

-0.058 (-1.93)***
-0.029 (-0.63)

-0.003 (0-06)
-1.339 (-1.79)***
0.537
52.782
112
21.68*

-0.003 (-0.07)
-1.339 (-1.79)***
0.531
52.787
112
21.16*

--------------------------Note: t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **,

------

and*** denotes 1~. 5~, and
10~ levels of significance respectively. The dependent variable is
profit which, and the explanatory variables, land and family labor, are
in log values.

Table 4.

Two-stage Switching Regression Bstiaates of a Restricted Profit
Function for Non-Participant Fara Households
(sample 229)

Explanatory Variables
Intercept
Landholding
Family labor
Schooling of household
head (male)
Schooling of spouse
Schooling of other working
household members
Mills ratio
R2

SSE
degrees of freedom
F ratio
Note:

OLS estimates
8.165 (14.29)*
0.664 (8.70)*
0.254 (2.38)**

2SLS estimates
8.579 (10.35) *
0.691 (5.77)*
0.175 (1. 77) •••

-0.010 (-0.55)
-0.042 (-0.80)

0.006 (0.32)
-0.038 (-0.73)

-0.015 (-0.45)
0.685 (0.84)
0.617
64.615
222
59.47*

-0.011 (-0.32)
0.570 (0.71)
0.619
62.076
222
60.14*

t-statistics are in parentheses. *,**,and*** denotes, respectively,
1~. 5~, and 10~ levels of significance. The dependent variable is
profit which, and the explanatory variables, land and family labor, are
in log values.
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Table S.

l'wO'."'"stage Switching Kegression (OLS) Estimates for Faaily Labor
Deaand Functions in Agriculture

Non-participant group

Explanatory Variables

Participant group

Intercept

4.846 (1.93)***

3.211 (2 .86) ••

Landholding

0.471 (4.11)*

0.527 (7.23)*

Community-level

agrl. wage

Family size
Age of the household head

-0.264 (-0.50)
1.030 (3.72)*
-0.661 (-1.87)***

0.921 (3.02)**

o. 721

(4.38)*

-0.392 (-1.79)***

Schooling of household
head (male)

0.044 ( 1.20)

0.054 ( 2.16)**

-0.01s (-0.27)

0.119 ( 1.52)

household members

0.04S ( 0.85)

0.054 ( 1.16)

Mills ratio

0.80S (0.92)

Schooling of spouse
Schooling of other working

R2

-2.3S4 (-1.97)***

0.464

0.494

SSE

63.4S6

85.414

degrees of freedom

110

220

F ratio

11.92*

26.88*

Notes:

t-statistics are in parentheses.

The dependent variable is log of

family labor use in farming and explanatory variables such as
landholding, community-level agricultural wage for male worker, family
size, and age of the household head are also in log values.

*, ••, and

••• denote, respectively, 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance.
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estimates for the farm households who do not sell out family labor for market
work.
Using Hausman's (1978) test for endogeneity of family labor (Tables 3
and 4), it can be shown that endogeneity is relevant for farm households who do
not sell out family labor for market work, while it is not for those who
participate in the labor market.

This implies that when family labor demand is

endogenously determined, appropriate instruments are necessary to correct for
such simultaneous equation bias.

The results in Table 4 also confirm that,

because of such simultaneous bias, education's impact on farm efficiency may be
underestimated when family labor endogeneity is not corrected.
Both land and family labor have positive effects, as expected, on farm
productivity for both types of farm households.

However, there exists

significant differences in production behavior of these two types of
households.

The Mills ratio estimates in the profit function indicate that

farm households who sell out family labor have less than average farm
productivity, while the households who do not sell out family labor have larger
than average farm productivity.

Moreover, the Mills ratios for family labor

demand function (Table 5) indicate that farm households who participate in

off-farm work have larger than average family labor demand in farming, while
the households who do not participate in off-farm market work have less than
average family labor demand in own farming.
Although education influences family labor demand in agriculture, it
has no effect in farm efficiency.

The negative effect of household head's

education on farm efficiency (Table 3), although inconceivable, is, however,
evident in some other studies (Jamison and Moock, 1981).13
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There are several reasons why the true productive value of education in
agriculture may not be properly measured in our estimation of the conditional
profit function.

First, the Cobb-Douglas specification of the model may impose

fewer options for education to play which may produce incomplete measures of

the true productive value of schooling, because of its greater restriction on
the feasible farm technology (Barichello, 1984).

Second, the conditional

profit function has an omitted variables problem because of its exclusion of
price variables such as prices of output and purchased inputs.14

Finally, the

family labor input may reflect measurement error because it ignores any direct
reference to labor supplied by different members of the family.

Thus, any

gains to be accrued from using the appropriate level and mix of family labor in
agriculture, as well as family labor allocation between farm and off-farm
market, uses is not captured in our model.
Although the first two problems cannot be dealt with in this paper, the
third problem is pursued below.

Since information on.the time allocation of

each member of the household is available from the survey, one can use such
information to predict wage offers for family members who use their time in the
family farm as unpaid workers on the basis of the wage earned by those who work
off-farm. 1 S The profit calculated as gross value of crops less expenditure on
purchased inputs is further netted out by excluding the predicted wage bill for
family labor and then estimate a functional form that uses this net profit as
the dependent variable and the predicted wage rates, among others, as
regressors.

This functional specification captures the gains from schooling in

family labor allocation of different categories between farm and off-farm uses.
The procedure is carried out here in the following way.

Family labor

is classified under three categories: household head, his spouse, and other
members, including economically active children.

A probit procedure is carried
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out (Table 6) for each category of members according to whether or not a person
in a particular group participates in off-farm work.

A wage equation is

estimated for the subsamples who participate in the labor market by including
age and education of the person as well as the Mills ratios calculated by using
the probit results reported in Table 6.

These estimates, which are reported in

Table 7, are then used to predict wages for three categories of family labor of
all samples which in turn are used to calculate the wage bill for unpaid family
labor.16

The profit net of the family labor wage bill is then taken as the

dependent variable and the Cobb-Douglas specification of a profit function is
estimated for all samples by including, among others, three types of predicted
wage offers (Table 8).

Furthermore, in case results suffer from possible selectivity bias due
to Cobb-Douglas specification of the model, a quadratic profit function is
estimated that utilizes all samples.

The results of the quadratic profit

function are also reported in Table 8.
The exercise carried out through Tables 6 to 8 indicate that the
household head's education has a positive significant value to farm efficiency.
This result was not apparent when schooling-induced variations in household
decision-making regarding family labor allocation between farm and off-farm
market uses were not taken into consideration.

Thus, the allocative role of

farmer education in family labor allocation was not captured when a profit
function, conditional on family labor, were estimated.
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Table 6. Probit Maxi.mull Likelihood Estiaates of Labor Market Participation
by Different Members of Fa:na Household
(Sample 364)
Explanatory Variables
Intercept
Landholding

Family size (age 10-65)
Community agrl. wage
Schooling of household
head (male)

HH head
-0.458
(-0.72)
-0.241
(-2.27)**
-0.069
(-2.46)**
-0.024
(-0.76)

Spouse
-3.649
(-4.67)*
-0.047
(-0.82)
-0.024
(-0.48)
0.241
( 2.92)*

Other members
-2.095
(-2.94)*
-0.118
(-1.37)
0.141
( 3.68)*
-0.011
(-0.30)

0.112
( 6.85)*

Schooling of spouse
(

0.155
6.07)*

Schooling of other working
household members
(

(-2.0) x Log Likelihood
Ratio

67 .986

65.463

0.094
2.52)**
23.483

Notes: Dummy dependent variable= 1, if household head works for market work
(76), or spouse works for market work (40), or any member other than household
head and his spouse works for market work (46), 0 otherwise. t-statistics are
in parentheses. •, ••, and••• denote, respectively, 1~, 5~, and 1~ levels of
significance.

Table 7. Estiaates of Wage Function for Different Members Working Off-farm

---------------------------------------·-----------------Explanatory Variables
HH head
Spouse
Other members
Intercept
Age
Education
Mills Ratio
F Ratio
Degrees of freedom

11.028
(0.79)
0.279
(1.66)***
2.028
(2.86)**
-0.120
(-0.08)
13.59*
72

47.438
(2.79)**
0.109
( 0.59)
-0.282
(-0.29)
-15.655
(-2.37)**
14.02*
62

Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses.
1~, 5~, and 10% levels of significance.

8.424
0.73)
0.249
( 1.59)
1.077
( 2.99)**
2.250
( 0.43)
5.45*
40
(

•,••,and••• denote, respectively,
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Table 8. Estimates of Restricted Profit (Gross Revenue Less of Purchased Input
Costs Less of Wage bill for Faaily Labor) Function

-------- -----------------Quadratic function

Explanatory Variables

Cobb-Douglas function

Intercept
Landholding
Landholding squared
Pred. wage for HH head
Pred. wage (head) squared
Pred. wage for wife
Pred. wage (wife) squared
Pred. wage for members
Pred. wage (memb) squared
Schooling of household
head (male)
Head's schooling squared
Schooling of wife
Wife's schooling squared
Schooling of other working
household members
Members' schooling squared

22.061 (4.38)*
0.887 (7.04)*

R2

degrees of freedom
F ratio
Note:

-1. 837 (-1.37)
-0.533 (-1. 76)***

-1.962 (-2.64)**
0.143 ( 1.69)***
0.003 ( 0.09)
0.019 ( 0.50)

0.369
192
16.06*

225566.50 (3.98)*
13890.67 (7.90)*
-592.825 (-1.86)***
-1854.16 (-1.11)
24.136 (0.99)
-1519.19 (-3.22)*
43.116 (3.75)*
-14057.7 (-3.45)*
253.458 (3.17)*
845.920 ( 1.64)***
-83.260 (-0.91)
301.361 ( 0.65)
-122 .o (-1.59)
-157.792 (-0.19)
0.722 (0.08)
0.417
349
17.98*

--------------- --------------- --------------- -

t-statistics are in parentheses. •• ••• and••• denotes 1~. 5%, and
1~ levels of significance respectively. The dependent variable is
profit which, and the explanatory variables, land, and three categories
of predicted wages are in log values for the Cobb-Douglas specification.
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Conclusions

The production or profit function approach often used to study the
impact of education on agricultural efficiency is potentially a misspecified

functional form if family labor is endogenously determined.

Labor endogeneity

may occur if family labor is not sold out either because of labor market
preferences or because family and hired labor are imperfect substitutes in
production.

This makes the production and consumption decisions of farm

operators nonseparable.

An agricultural household model that encompasses both

decisions may be employed to motivate the choice of appropriate instruments.
Instrumental variables can be used in a restricted profit function to properly
study the impact of education on agricultural productivity, which otherwise
will be underestimated.
An agricultural household model is developed to show under what
conditions family labor demand may be endogenous.

Self-selection into labor

market participation is endogeneously determined by the farm household's family
characteristics as well as other factors.

It produces a sample selection bias

if differences in production behavior conditional on labor market participation
of farm households are not explained.

This is an argument for using a

two-stage switching regressions model for estimating a restricted profit

function conditional on family labor.

An empirical implementation of such a procedure with data from
Bangladesh suggests that family labor demand is indeed endogenous when
households do not participate in the labor market.

Moreover, it is found that

the production behavior of farm households who participate in the labor market
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is different from those who do not participate in the labor market.

Since

labor market participation is endogeneously determined, this may suggest that
correcting for this form of sample selection bias in the restricted profit
function reduces the impact of family background characteristics on the
productive capacity of farmers and, hence, the education coefficient may indeed
measure the causal impact of farmer education on farm efficiency.

A conditional profit function, although permits the education variable
to pick up any returns in variable profit due to schooling-induc ed variations
in the predicted level of family labor when family labor becomes endogenous,
yet may not measure the true productive value of schooling in agriculture.
This is partly due to the fact that such functional specification does not
permit education to pick up any returns that may accrue due to the allocative
role of education in family labor allocation between farm and off-farm uses.
It serves as an argument for using a profit function unconditional on family
labor by subtracting the predicted wage bill for family labor from the profit
on the basis of wage estimates for those who work off-farm for wage.

This

procedure when followed indeed confirms that farmer education has a productive
value to farm efficiency in Bangladesh.
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Footnotes

•

This research was supported by a postdoctoral fellowship from the
Rockefeller Foundation and additional research support from the Hewlett
Foundation. I have benefitted from the comments on an earlier draft of this
paper by Paul Schultz, T. N. Srinivasan, and John Strauss and the
participants of Yale's Microeconomics Workshop in Labor and Population, and
the Northeast Universities Development Consortia Conference at Yale
University.

1

Welch (1970) describes tae productivity effect as the "worker effect• and
the allocative efficiency effect as •allocative effect• of education •. He
defines worker effect as the "increased output per change in education,
holding other factor quantities constant•, while •allocative• effect helps
increase farm operators' "ability to acquire and decode information about
costs and productive characteristics of other inputs• (Welch, 1970; p. 342)
Welch argues with supporting evidence that allocative effect of education
is much more important than the worker effect, which subsequently confirmed
by other findings (Huffman, 1977).

2

Family labor may constitute heterogenous units such as adult male, adult
female, and child labor so that Lin specification (1) is a vector
of these different heterogenous labor inputs. In South Asian countries,
for example Bangladesh, limited wage employment exists for certain
categories of family 'labor such as female and child labor outside family
farm (Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1984).

3

When the production function (1) is well-behaved and farms face
fixed prices and maximize profits, by duality theory, a restricted or
variable profit function exists that relates variable profit to the prices
of outputs, prices of variable inputs, and quantities of the fixed inputs.

4

Barichello (1984) argued that the level of fixed inputs, such as capital,
which is fixed for reasons of shortrun adjustment costs, is likely to
be influenced by the management skills, or schooling, of the farm operator.
Using Canadian agricultural data, Barichello reported that endogeneity of
the level of capital inputs makes estimates of education variables
underestimated.

s

Jamison and Moock (1981) introduced some family background factors such as
age and occupational status of farm household head as instrumental
variables, while estimating production function for Nepalese farmers to
correct what they called •over-estimated effect of education•. Effect of
education in a production function may be over-estimated since family
background factors might potentially influence the productive capacity of
farmers, and, thus, education, which is highly correlated with these
factors, may proxy for them. The motivation for using instruments in this
paper is, however, derived from the model which argues that self-selection
in occupation can produce endogeneity of family labor demand, which may be
determined endogenously by, among others, family background factors. Thus,
correcting sample selection bias, in addition to simultaneity bias, may give
consistent estimates of education variable, which may reflect causal effect
of education on farm efficiency.
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6

If family labor is a vector of heterogenous labor inputs, then L will be
a vector of such heterogenous family labor inputs. Accordingly, leisure,
M, market wage, W, education characteristics, E, total working hours, 0, and
family labor supply to market work, S, will also be vectors. Moreover, if
some components of family labor are sold out but others are not, then the
model developed in this paper needs to be qualified accordingly.

7

Assume that there are no purchased inputs involved in production.
Alternatively, Q is gross value of crops less expenditure on purchased
inputs, in which case equation 3(iv) is a restricted profit function. In
thes latter cas.e, labor purchased from market is unskilled and imperfect
substitutes for family labor.

8

If farm households sell out family labor (S>O), the optimal condition for
family labor allocation is

For a particular household with a given education endowment, the market
wage is fixed, and thus, production and consumption decisions for such
household are separable. In this case, the household's utility maximization
boils down to two sub-maximization problems. The first is to maximize
income, I, for any work effort of the household in own farm and market
work. Given this income, and supply of effort, the household then maximizes
utility which determines optimal amount of leisure and consumption of other
goods. That is to say,
maximize
I= PqQ, subject to
L*
Q

=L

+

s,

= Q(L, E,

and
T)

in the first step, which will lead to optimum level of income as a function
of given effort, L*, E, T, and Pq• In the second stage, the problem is to
maximize,
U = U(C, M, R)
subject to
PcC + PqR = I(L*, E, T, Pq) + WS
and, 0

= L* +

M.

Thus, maximization in step one determines I as a function of given effort,
L*, where the effort is itself determined by the maximization problem in
step two which, of course, displays an income-leisure trade-off.
9

It is shown latter that if S > 0, the effect of education on family
labor demand in agriculture depends on the relative returns of labor in two
income earning activities (i.e •• family farming versus market work).

lO This way of showing the effect of education on family labor demand is
possible because the production and consumption decisions are separable for
farm households who participate in the marke~ work for wage income.
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11 The Cobb-Douglas functional form is likely to be an overly restrictive
characterization of the actual farm technology. and hence. may restrict the
opportunity for education to profitably exploit the technology (Barichello.
1984). This is perhaps the case due to the homogeneity restriction that is
imposed on the Cobb-Douglas production function. Despite its drawbacks.
the Cobb-Douglas specification is widely applied to describe farm technology
and to measure the productive value of schooling in farming. Thus.
consistent with this tradition. the results of a Cobb-Douglas functional
form are reported here.
12 Because price variables are not included (which are not available) in the
conditional profit function. conditional on family labor. such function may
better be called a value-added production function rather than a profit
function.
l3 When a quadratic profit function. quadratic in education variables.
was estimated (results are not shown here). it shows a non-linear role of
education in farm production (see also Jamison and Moock. 1981). The
non-linear effect of education implies that education has a payoff for
higher level of farmer education.
14 The left-out price variables such as prices of outputs and inputs may not
create severe problem for estimation in the context of Bangladesh. Given
the aggregate valued-added production or profit function. aggregate prices
(i.e. yearly) of both outputs and inputs are required which. according to
one study. do not vary across regions (Khandker. 1983)
lS The procedure adopted here essentially is to estimate earnings for the
subsample of different household members working in the off-farm work for
wage income. and on this basis predict a wage offer for those who work in
the family farm as unpaid family workers. This procedure is due to Beckman
(1974. 1979) and is being widely used by researchers. One should, however.
note that this method will generate inconsistent parameter estimates if the
two subsamples differ in unmeasured characteristics.
16

The mean predicted wages for three categories of labor for all 364
samples are. respectively. Taka 33.43 for household head. Taka 19.42 for
household head's spouse. and Taka 24.19 for other members as against the
actual mean wages. Taka 39.S8, Taka 29.07. and Taka 27.61. for those who
work outside farm for wages.
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